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Abstract 
Ordinary citizens are increasingly using mobile instant messaging apps 
such as WhatsApp for politically-related activities. Compared to other 
‘semi-public’ online platforms, WhatsApp provides a more intimate and 
controlled environment in which users can almost simultaneously gather 
and share news, discuss politics, and mobilize others. Relying on two-
wave panel data collected in Spain, USA, and New Zealand, this study 
examines the mediating role of WhatsApp political discussion in the 
relationships between different types of news use and various forms of 
political participation. First, our findings reveal WhatsApp discussion has 
a positive influence on activism, and a more nuanced effect on 
conventional participation. Second, results are partially supportive of a 
fully mediated set of influences between news media and social media 
news uses and both types of participation via WhatsApp. Finally, the 
study examines age differential effects between younger (Gen Xers and 
Millennials) and older (Boomers) age groups. 
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Instant Messaging (IM) software for smartphones has gained widespread 
popularity and acceptance over the last years, especially among the 
youngest. WhatsApp is the dominant player in IM in 107 countries around 
the world, with more than 1.5 billion monthly active users who exchange 
nearly 60 billion messages a day 1 (Bobrov, 2018). While most of IM 
conversations are relational in nature (e.g., to coordinate private activities 
and keep in touch with friends and family) or primarily oriented to 
fulfill entertainment needs, some other uses of IM are informational, that 
is, associated with news gathering and sharing, and discussion of politics 
and public affairs (Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; Valeriani & 
Vaccari, 2018). 
Some of the distinctive characteristics of IM apps such as WhatsApp are 
their immediacy and privacy. WhatsApp allows its users to message 
anyone (including groups of people) and share multimedia content at any 
time. Also, WhatsApp provides a relatively private and controlled 
environment for discussion, where users feel safer and less vulnerable to 
social sanctions. These attributes make IM apps well suited for politically 
oriented activities, especially attractive to those perceiving their views as 
extreme or minority, and to those using these channels to mobilize their 
networks for political activism – namely demonstrations, protests, 
boycotts, etc. (see Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). 
Based on this theoretical background, the present study 
examines informational uses of WhatsApp and their potentially 
democratic implications. First, we explore the differential role of 
WhatsApp discussion in fostering conventional and activist forms of 
participation. Second, and drawing on a citizen communication mediation 
framework (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005), we test an empirical 
indirect model of communication effects. Specifically, we shed light over 
citizens’ news use indirect effects on political participation through 
WhatsApp discussion, described as follows: (1) Citizens obtain 
information about politics and current events from news and social media; 
(2) this information provides (over time) the ‘raw material’ that fuels 
interpersonal discussions via WhatsApp-like apps; and (3) WhatsApp 
political discussions lead to increased levels of conventional and activist 
participation. We also examine generational differences in this mediation 
model between two age groups: Baby Boomers and older adults, on the 
one hand, and Millennials and Gen Xers, on the other. Compared to 
cross-sectional designs, the temporal component of our longitudinal data 
allows us to better assess causal relationships among our variables of 
interest. Furthermore, the cross-country nature of our sample provides 
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our results with higher external validity than those from single-country 
studies. 
WhatsApp as a platform for discussion of news and 
political events 
People largely learn about their political surroundings through media, 
whether traditional, digital or social. The mass mediated picture of the 
social world – in the form of news, comment, pictures, videos, memes, 
posts, etc. – provides the ‘raw material’ that fuels political discussion with 
family, friends, or acquaintances (Mondak, 2010, p. 94). This connection 
between news uses and political talk is well established in the literature 
and has been found in a variety of face-to-face and online – including 
social media – discussion environments (see Chan, Chen, & Lee, 2017; 
Cho et al., 2009; Kim, Hsu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013). 
Mobile news users commonly arrive at news content by directly visiting 
news organizations websites and through social media (Pew Research 
Center, 2017). Using IM apps such as WhatsApp gives them the 
opportunity to contextualize and spur their political discussions by sharing 
links, pictures, videos, memes, or gifs that relate to politics or current 
events. Alternatively – although perhaps less frequently – WhatsApp 
users can also discuss and share content from traditional news media 
sources by taking pictures of newspaper articles, recording audio from 
radio or television programs, etc. IM apps users can therefore access 
news anywhere anytime through their phones, and almost immediately 
(and from the same device) open a chat window and start talking about 
what they have just learnt with their favorite discussion partner/s or 
group/s. Much like it happens with other social media platforms, our 
theoretical and empirical models assume that news from social and 
traditional media sources stimulates political discussion on WhatsApp. 
WhatsApp political discussion and conventional 
participation 
The development of internet-based platforms and apps has changed the 
ways in which people talk about politics. Barely few decades ago, this 
type of discussions took place almost exclusively face-to-face or over the 
phone. Nowadays, an increased amount of political talk occurs in online 
environments. Accumulated empirical evidence expanding over the past 
two decades suggests that, for the most part, and similar to face-to-face 
discussions, online political talk has beneficial effects on conventional 
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forms of civic and political engagement. A number of theoretical reasons 
– some of them common to any form of political talk, others specific to 
online discussions – explain these positive outcomes. Overall, political 
discussion raises awareness about social problems, helps identify 
opportunities for political action, and provides a context for persuasion 
and mobilization (see Gil de Zúñiga, Barnidge, & Diehl, 2018; Rojas & 
Puig-i-Abril, 2009; Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2017). 
Political talk has also indirect paths to participation: those who frequently 
discuss politics also tend to show higher levels of political interest, 
knowledge, efficacy, and cognitive elaboration, which in turn influences 
their level of political engagement (see Eveland, 2004; Kwak, Williams, 
Wang, & Lee, 2005). 
More recently, IM apps such as WhatsApp have been added to the 
already wide collection of online platforms for interpersonal discussion. 
Although this phenomenon is relatively recent, some studies indicate that 
IM app use for political talk is rapidly increasing in many countries. For 
example, in Germany, 25% of IM app users discuss politics on their 
smartphones, a figure that rises to 27.8% in Italy, and 38.1% in Britain 
(Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). Concerning its democratic meaning, some 
preliminary findings suggest that mobile-based political talk may also 
foster civic and political engagement, both directly and through a ‘spillover 
effect’ (i.e., via the stimulation of face-to-face and other forms of 
computer-mediated political discussions) (Chan et al., 2017). 
Besides the general arguments linking discussion and participation, 
specific affordances of mobile technology may also be considered to 
explain the democratic outcomes of smartphone use for political talk. 
Thus, one of the unique features of mobile communication is 
its immediacy, i.e., the possibility of contacting (virtually) anyone and 
sharing content anytime, anywhere. When using IM apps, this ubiquitous 
character may exert an enhancing effect on the frequency of discussion 
and its subsequent behavioral outcomes, since there is no need to wait 
for a face-to-face encounter or to sit in front of the desktop to start a 
political conversation. Furthermore, some online forms of formal political 
participation – such as donating money to a campaign or contacting a 
politician – can easily be performed through mobile apps, which 
centralizes the discussion-participation process on a single device. Based 
on these considerations, we pose our first hypothesis: 
H1: WhatsApp use for discussion positively predicts conventional 
participation. 
WhatsApp discussion as a safe environment for activism 
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Not all forms of political involvement revolve around institutionalized 
activities such as voting, campaigning, or contacting politicians. At times, 
citizens engage in actions directed against elites, which are aimed at 
achieving social change through various forms of protest (Ekman & 
Amnå, 2012; Norris, 2002). These include politically motivated acts, 
whether legal (e.g., political consumerism, buycotting) or illegal (e.g., civil 
disobedience, confronting the police); individual (e.g., creating and 
signing petitions) or collective (e.g., participating in demonstrations, 
political rallies, or marches) (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). 
Activist forms of participation seem to suit particularly well the post-
materialist values of post-industrial societies. In this novel context, the 
decline of political trust, the increased people’s skepticism toward politics, 
and even lower voter turnouts may not necessarily be signs of democratic 
erosion and could be interpreted in the light of the emergence of new 
forms of political engagement (Norris, 2002; Saunders, 2014). In fact, 
many of those who engage in protest or activist politics also tend to show 
high levels of political interest and commitment to democratic principles 
(Curtice & Jowell, 1997). 
On the basis of these conceptual and empirical distinctions, recent 
research has found some uses of internet-based and social media to 
have a beneficial effect on these alternative forms of political 
engagement. The reasons behind these influences are varied. Thus, on 
the one hand, social networking sites and other online media are an 
important source of mobilizing information not commonly found in 
traditional media, or that might be difficult to obtain in face-to-face 
encounters for a variety of reasons – from fear to social rejection or legal 
consequences to comparatively reduced opportunities for political 
discussion (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). On the other hand, some of the 
affordances of the social web are especially well suited to channel social 
pressure and reinforcement, which are particularly necessary tools to 
persuade potential participants in the context of activism (Valenzuela, 
Correa, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2018; Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). For example, 
IM apps offer low-effort mechanisms for opinion leaders and social 
organizations to contact and mobilize their networks (friends, followers, or 
members). These tools also allow for a better tailoring of the messages to 
meet specific individual and group needs and preferences. Finally, online 
media might also play an important role in the construction of group 
identity, because they facilitate the development of shared experiences 
and views. This ultimately helps to build social capital that can be 
mobilized for activism (Bakardjieva, 2009; Valenzuela, Arriagada, & 
Scherman, 2012). 
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Most of these theoretical explanations apply to IM apps, and therefore it 
seems reasonable to expect a beneficial effect of WhatsApp discussion 
on activism. Furthermore, WhatsApp has distinctive affordances that can 
make it decidedly appealing for discussing politics and mobilizing protest. 
For example, WhatsApp provides a relatively private and controlled 
environment where discussants may feel safe from social surveillance 
and rejection. WhatsApp users can create and join clearly defined groups 
where they can control the reach of the content they share, thereby 
preventing their opinions from damaging their reputation or relationships 
with other members of their networks that may not share their views. In 
fact, some preliminary evidence suggests that a non-negligible amount of 
IM app users share political information and opinions that they 
would not send via other more open online environments such as social 
media (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). 
This controlled nature of WhatsApp may be particularly attractive to those 
perceiving their views as minority or extreme opinions that might cause 
social sanction, and to those using these channels to mobilize their 
networks for activism (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2018). Based on these 
explanations, we pose our second hypothesis: 
H2: WhatsApp use for discussion positively predicts activist participation. 
Differential effects of WhatsApp discussion across 
generations 
There are several reasons to expect that the above hypothesized impact 
of WhatsApp on formal and activist participation may be more intense in 
younger than older generations, either due to generational, life-cycle 
effects, or both. Previous theoretical and observational accounts pose 
that each generation might react differently to the same communicative 
stimuli (i.e., WhatsApp discussion) based on the contextual 
characteristics of the era in which they received their early political 
socialization (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008; see also Grasso, 2014). 
Different from Millennials or Gen Xers, older generations (Boomers) were 
politically socialized in a world without internet. In older age cohorts, we 
might therefore expect a pattern of ‘inertia’ and ‘generational attenuation’ 
of the influence of WhatsApp discussion that would result in 
comparatively smaller effects on politically-related behaviors (see 
Bachmann, Kaufholf, Lewis, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010; Quintelier & 
Vissers, 2008). 
Likewise, a complementary theoretical account for this argument would 
be a ‘generational accentuation’ of the effects among younger cohorts 
due to their different patterns of IM use and the larger size of their 
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discussion networks on WhatsApp. Younger generations not only show 
higher levels of technological expertise regarding mobile use but, more 
importantly, have more online friends and belong to more WhatsApp 
groups (Chan, 2018; Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014). This could in turn, 
increase their levels of online and social media social capital and political 
information, subsequently enhancing the mobilization potential of 
WhatsApp (see Gil de Zúñiga, Barnidge, & Scherman, 2017). 
In addition, younger generations of activists are using communication 
technologies in ways that go beyond exchanging information. Digital 
media and internet-based applications are becoming organizational 
structures of collective political action that complement – and sometimes 
replace – the role of conventional, ‘brick and mortar’ organizations (i.e., 
unions, political parties, or NGOs) in which ‘the communication network 
becomes the organization form of the political action’ (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012, p. 9). These connective action networks are particularly 
appealing for younger age cohorts, heirs of postindustrial democracies 
and characterized by higher levels of individualism and disaffection with 
political organizations (Inglehart, 1997). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H3: The relationship between WhatsApp discussion and conventional 
participation is more intense among younger cohorts. 
H4: The relationship between WhatsApp discussion and activism is more 
intense among younger cohorts. 
From news uses to participation: indirect pathways 
through WhatsApp discussion 
The associations between news use – whether traditional or online – and 
political participation has been well established in the literature. These 
connections, however, are not always straightforward, but involve a 
combination of often overlapping, direct and indirect effects (Cho 
et al., 2009; McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2009; Yoo, Kim, & Gil de 
Zúñiga, 2017). Moving beyond paradigms of direct effects (stimulus-
response), the core of the communication mediation model proposes that 
communication stimulus (i.e., media use and interpersonal 
communication) channel the influence of previous orientations of the 
audience – i.e., ‘structural, cultural, cognitive and motivational 
characteristics’ – on behavioral responses such as civic or political 
participation (McLeod et al., 2009, p. 238). Later developments of the 
model have found that certain communication patterns further mediate the 
relationship between media uses and participation. For example, 
the citizen communication mediation model specifies a mediating 
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mechanism between informational uses of media and political 
participation via (on and offline) discussion (Shah et al., 2005). 
Building on these prior ideas, this study examines the mediating role of 
WhatsApp discussion in channeling the influence of media uses on 
various types of participation (behavioral responses). As explained above, 
smartphones allow their users to access news content, discuss about it 
and, to a certain extent, participate in political activities. This centralized 
and potentially immediate nature of the process gives us grounds to 
believe that WhatsApp discussion may invigorate this multi-step, indirect 
process. Based on these explanations, we pose an additional set of 
hypotheses: 
H5: WhatsApp discussion mediates the effect of news media use on 
conventional participation. 
H6: WhatsApp discussion mediates the effect of social media news use 
on conventional participation. 
H7: WhatsApp discussion mediates the effect of news media use on 
activism. 
H8: WhatsApp discussion mediates the effect of social news use on 
activism. 
Much in the same way as for the conditional effects hypothesized in H3 
and H4, we might reasonably expect these indirect routes to participation 
(H5-H8) to vary across generational groups. In accordance with the 
‘attenuation’ (for Boomers) and ‘accentuation’ (for Millennials and Gen 
Xers) effects of WhatsApp stated above, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H9: The indirect effects of news and social media uses on participation 




Data were gathered from surveys in 22 countries from the Americas, 
Asia, Europe and South Africa. The study was developed collaboratively 
by a partnership between research groups based in Austria (University of 
Vienna) and New Zealand (Massey University). The survey was designed 
and administered by both research groups with the support of the media-
polling group Nielsen. Using online opt-in panels at each country, from a 
pool of potential respondents over 10 million, Nielsen generated 22 
samples whose demographic characteristics closely match those reported 
by census agencies (for detailed country and demographic breakdowns, 
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see Gil de Zúñiga, Ardèvol-Abreu, Diehl, Patiño, & Liu, 2019; Gil de 
Zúñiga & Liu, 2017). The first wave of the study (W1) was distributed, 
concurrently in all countries, from 14 to 24 September 2015. The same 
respondents were re-contacted six months later – between 22 March and 
1 April – for a second wave (W2). 
The survey items about WhatsApp discussion, used as endogenous 
variable in this study, were included only in W2 in three of the countries 
(Spain, United States, and New Zealand). Despite being culturally 
different, these countries share important common features such as being 
established democracies, having an independent and pluralistic media 
environment, and showing high mobile penetration rates. These traits 
provide us with a relatively diverse sample that establishes a benchmark 
for future comparisons with other contexts. Overall cooperation rate in 
W1 averaged 77% across the panel (AAPOR, 2016; COOP3). In the three 
countries of this study, a total of 3307 respondents completed the 
questionnaire in W1: Spain (n = 1,019); United States (n = 1,161); and New 
Zealand (n = 1,157). In W2, 1,436 respondents re-answered the 
questionnaire, for an overall retention rate of 43.42%. By country, 
retention rates were 30% in Spain, 46% in the United States; and 52% in 
New Zealand. 
Endogenous variables 
Activism. This variable was measured as the extent to which individuals 
engage in different forms of protest. We asked respondents how often 
(1 = never to 7 = all the time) they take part in ‘boycotting a certain product 
or service because of the social or political values of the company,’ 
‘attending a political rally, participating in any demonstrations, protests, or 
marches,’ or ‘creating an online petition’ (3 items scale, 
W1 Cronbach’s α = .68; M = 1.88; SD = 1.13; 
W2 Cronbach’s α = .65; M = 1.67; SD = 0.97). 
Conventional participation. We measured respondents’ tendency to 
engage in parliamentary (election-related) or contact activities, following 
the procedures and arrangements of representative democracy (Ekman & 
Amnå, 2012). We included questions about respondents’ frequency of 
engagement in activities such as ‘an online question and answer session 
with a politician,’ ‘contacting an elected public official,’ or voting in ‘local or 
statewide elections’ and ‘national or presidential elections’ (4 items scale, 
W1 Cronbach’s α = .67; M = 3.63; SD = 1.16; 
W2 Cronbach’s α = .61; M = 3.66; SD = 1.11). 
WhatsApp use for political discussion. We asked participants about 
the frequency with which they use WhatsApp ‘to have discussions about 
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politics and current events,’ and ‘to exchange views about what is going 
on in politics and public affairs’ (pooled sample, W2 Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient = .97; M = 1.64; SD = 1.25; Spain, W2 Spearman-
Brown = .95; M = 2.58; SD = 1.68; United States, W2 Spearman-
Brown = .99; M = 1.40; SD = 1.01; New Zealand, W2 Spearman-
Brown = .98; M = 1.38; SD = 0.90). 
Exogenous variables 
Social media use for news. Building on previous measures of the 
construct (see Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2018), we asked respondents for their 
level of use of social media ‘to stay informed about current events and 
public affairs,’ ‘to stay informed about [their] local community,’ and ‘to get 
news about current events from mainstream media’ 
(W1 Cronbach’s α = .89; M = 3.72; SD = 1.65). 
News media use. The study considered respondents’ frequency of 
exposure to a variety of news media other than social media. 
Respondents were asked how often (1 = never to 7 = all the time) they get 
news from ‘television news,’ ‘newspapers,’ ‘online news sites,’ ‘radio,’ and 
‘citizen journalism sites (non-professional journalism, e.g., blogs)’ (5 items 
scale; W1 Cronbach’s α = .58; M = 4.19; SD = 1.07). 
Control variables 
We controlled for the effect of three different attributes of political 
discussion: frequency of offline discussion, frequency of online 
discussion, and discussion network size. Our regression models also 
controlled for internal and external political efficacy, political 
interest, political trust, political knowledge (3 items additive scale based 
on multiple-choice questions), and strength of ideological identification (3 
items coded from ‘0’ = no ideological identification to ‘10’ = strong 
ideological identification). Finally, demographic variables were measured 
with single items such as age (M = 47.00; SD = 16.21), gender (55.7% 
female), race (84.8% whites), income self-perception (‘1’ = people who are 
the least well off in society to ‘10’ = people who are the most well 
off; M = 5.87; SD = 1.83), and education (‘1’ = elementary school to 
‘6’ = graduate school or higher; Mdn = 4, some college). 
Results 
The first hypotheses stated a positive effect of WhatsApp discussion on 
conventional participation (H1) and activism (H2). The first and third 
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autoregressive models 2 in Table 1 (pooled sample) show a positive 
influence of WhatsApp use on conventional participation 
(H1; β = .056, p < .01) and activism (H2; β = .253, p < .001). Further 
analyses comparing the magnitude of these two beta coefficients show 
that the effect of WhatsApp discussion is more intense on activism than 
on conventional participation (p < .001). 3 As shown in the third regression 
model in Table 1, WhatsApp for discussion was – apart from the 
autoregressive term – the main predictor of activism, and accounted for 
5.1% of its variance. 














Block	1:	Demographics	W¹	 	 	 	 	
			Age	/	Generationa	 .058**	 .105**	 -.052*	 .107***	
			Gender	(1	=	female)	 -.003	 -.003	 .017	 .022	
			Race	(1	=	white)	 .038	 .047*	 .019	 .011	
			Income		 .005	 .001	 .007	 .005	
			Education	 .076***	 .070***	 .011	 .013	




			Strength	of	Ideology	 .009	 .010	 .020	 .017	
			Political	Knowledge	 .050*	 .056*	 .078**	 .078**	
			Political	Interest	 .031	 .035	 -.037	 -.032	
			Internal	Efficacy	 -.034	 -.029	 .009	 .016	
			External	Efficacy	 .059**	 .051*	 .072**	 .072**	
			Discussion	Network	Size	 .037	 .037	 .084**	 .087**	
			Offline	Discussion	Frequency		 -.012	 -.017	 -.027	 -.033	
			Online	Discussion	Frequency		 -.013	 -.020	 .045	 .047	
			Political	Trust	 .016	 .019	 -.042	 -.047*	
	 	 	 	 						∆R2	 14.2%	 14.6%	 19.2%	 19.2%	
Block	3	(Autoregressive)	W¹	 	 	 	 	
			Conventional	Participation		 .664***	 .677***	 		---	 		---	
			Activism	 			---	 			---	 .498***	 .499***	
∆R2	 30.0%	 31.9%	 20.5%	 20.5%	
Block	4:	IVs	of	Interest	W¹	 	 	
			News	Media	Use	 .022	 .022	 -.019	 -.020	
			SM	News		 .010	 .006	 -.011	 -.011	
















This positive influence of WhatsApp discussion on both forms of 
participation was confirmed through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
analysis (see Figure 1). Our model assumes direct effects of WhatsApp 
use on conventional and activist participation, and also indirect influences 
of news media use and social media news on both forms of participation 
via WhatsApp discussion. 4 This model provided a very good fit to the 
data: χ 2 = 3.27; df = 4; p = .51; RMSEA < 0.001, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.005, 
SRMR = .01. The SEM regression parameters corroborated that 
WhatsApp discussion predicts formal participation (γ = .086, p < .01) and, 























Block	5:	Mediation	and		Interaction	W¹	 	 	 	
			WhatsApp	Discussion		 .056**	 .109***	 .253***	 .372***	
				WhatsApp	Discussion	*	Agea		 			---	 -.110**	 			---	 -.231***	
						∆R2	 0.3%	 0.6%	 5.1%	 0.6%	









































This picture becomes more nuanced when one examines the above-
mentioned effects at the disaggregated, country level. Thus, the 
relationships between WhatsApp discussion and conventional 
participation (H1) seem to be country-dependent: WhatsApp discussion 
positively influences conventional participation in Spain (β = .110, p < .05), 
but the association does not remain significant in the United States 
(β = .040, n. s.), and only approaches acceptable levels of significance in 
New Zealand (β = .065, p < .10). These findings provide only partial 
support for H1. By contrast, the positive effect of WhatsApp discussion on 
activism (H2) is more robust and holds in all three subsamples when we 
separately examine each country (Spain, β = .296, p < .001; United 
States, β = .182, p < .001; New Zealand, β = .265, p < .001). Differences 
between standardized coefficients of activism and formal participation 
remain significant in all subsamples at the .01 level or better (see note 3). 
These findings provide strong support for H2 and for the external validity 
of the effect. 
Digging into more detail on these associations, H3 and H4 proposed 
‘generational effects’ that may come into play in the relationships between 
WhatsApp discussion and different forms of participation: conventional 
(H3) and activism (H4). Following previous approaches (Shah, Kwak, & 
Holbert, 2001), we chose 1964 as the cut-off year for the older and 
younger groups, and dummy-coded the generation variable: 
0 = Millennials and Gen Xers; 1 = Boomers and olders. The two interaction 
models in Table 1 confirm H3 and H4 and show that ‘generation’ 
moderates both the relationship between WhatsApp discussion and 
conventional participation (H3, β = −.110, p < .01), and the association 
between WhatsApp discussion and activism (H4, β = −.231, p < .001). As 
visible in the slopes of the regression lines in Figures 2 and 3 (plotted with 
the aid of the PROCESS macro, see Hayes, 2013, Model 1), the young 





























WhatsApp discussion on both types of participation. On the one hand, the 
effect of WhatsApp on conventional participation is strong and positive for 
the young group (point estimate = .105 [.025]; 95% C. I. = 0.056 to 0.154), 
but non-significant for the old group (Figure 2 and Table 3). On the other 
hand, the direct effect of WhatsApp use on activism is positive for both 
generational groups, although, once again, the association is stronger in 
the younger cohort (point estimate = .295 [.023]; 95% C. I. = 0.250 to 
0.339) than in the older (point estimate = .090 [.023]; 95% C. I. = 0.044 to 


























Hypotheses H5 to H8 predicted indirect effects between different media 
uses and political participation via WhatsApp discussion. Because these 
hypotheses assume a particular causal direction (i.e., that different media 
uses affect subsequent levels of participation), exogenous variables 
(media use and social media news use) come from W1, while endogenous 
variables (WhatsApp discussion, conventional participation, and activism) 
come from W2. Based on the SEM model in Figure 1, Table 2 summarizes 
the findings concerning these indirect effects in the pooled sample. On 
the one hand, news media use indirectly stimulates conventional 




indirect effect of social media use for news on conventional participation 
is (barely) non-significant (H6, γ = .006, p < .10). On the other hand, both 
news media use and social media news use boost activism indirectly, via 
WhatsApp discussion (H7, γ = .029, p < .01; H8, γ = .022, p < .05). 


















Similar as for H1 and H2, we further examined these indirect influences 
(H5-H8) by replicating the above regression-based analyses on each of 
our country subsamples (results not included in Table 2). We found that 
the indirect effects of media use on participation (H5, H7, and H8) are not 
robust across countries. All the mediation routes fell outside the range of 
significance in the three subsamples, with just one exception: the indirect 
effect of social media news on activism via WhatsApp discussion in Spain 
(H8, γ = .048, p < .05). The smaller size of these country subsamples 
probably influenced the ability to detect significant effects, because 
statistical significance of the SEM γ regression coefficients is sample-size 
dependent. These results provide only partial support for H5, H7, and H8, 
but no support at all for H6. 
Finally, H9 addressed potential generational differences in the indirect 
effects hypothesized in H5-H8. In order to test this final hypothesis, we 
developed a moderated mediation model (Hayes, 2013; Model 58) that 
estimates the significance of the difference between the indirect effects at 
the two values of the moderator (0 = Millennials and Gen Xers; 
1 = Boomers and olders). This model assumes that the moderator (W) 
operates: (a) on the relationship between the independent variable (X) 
and the mediator (M); and (b) on the relationship between the mediator 
(M) and the dependent variable (Y). In our models, X = ‘news media use’ 
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or ‘social media news;’ W = ‘generation;’ M = ‘WhatsApp discussion;’ and 
Y = ‘conventional participation’ or ‘activism.’ 5 
Since our previous results did not support H6, we skipped the analyses of 
generational differences in the indirect pathway ‘social media 
news’ → ‘WhatsApp discussion’ → ‘conventional participation.’ Our 
analyses show that the indirect effects related to H5 and H7 are 
conditional on the generation. Thus, ‘generation’ moderates the following 
indirect effects: (a) ‘news media use’ → ‘WhatsApp 
discussion’ → ‘conventional participation’ (H5; index of moderated 
mediation = −.026 [.012]; 95% C. I. = −.053 to −.006); 6 and (b) ‘news 
media use’ → ‘WhatsApp discussion’ → ‘activism’ (H7; index of moderated 
mediation = −.050 [.021], 95% C. I. = −.093 to −.010). 7 Conversely, 
‘generation’ does not moderate the indirect effect of ‘social media news’ 
on ‘activism’ through ‘WhatsApp discussion’ (H8; index of moderated 
mediation = −.022 [.013], 95% C. I. = −.049 to .001). As for H3 and H4, the 
indirect effect for Millennials and Gen Xers is, in both pathways, more 
accentuated than for Boomers and olders (see Table 3 for further details). 







WhatsApp	(W2)	!	Activism	(W2)	 Young	 .295	[.023]	 		.250	to	.339	
















This study utilized an indirect effects paradigm to examine WhatsApp 
discussion as a mechanism – similar to face-to-face or other internet-
based modes of discussion – channeling the effects of news and social 
media uses on conventional and activist forms of participation. Overall, 
our results provide grounds for optimism regarding the role of mobile 
communications in promoting a participatory citizenship in two ways. 
First, WhatsApp political discussion seems – at least in some contexts 
and for some age groups – to foster conventional forms of participation 
such as voting, contacting elected officials, or participating in a question 
and answer session with politicians. 
Second, our analyses suggest a distinctly stronger, cross-country 
consistent effect of WhatsApp discussion on activism. These politically-
motivated forms of protest are not necessarily a sign of democratic 
erosion within the paradigm of ‘postindustrial societies,’ characterized by 
overall increased levels of distrust and skepticism, greater need for self-
expression, and higher propensity to challenge authority (Inglehart, 1997; 
Norris, 2002). In this regard, activism should be seen as an opportunity to 
strengthen democratic control of the political elites and reactivate citizens’ 
engagement in democratic decision-making processes. 
There may be a number of reasons for the larger influence of WhatsApp 
discussion on activism – compared to that on formal participation. For 
example, users may perceive WhatsApp offers more control over who 
can see their messages than other more open online environments. As a 
result, they may have less reservation to discuss political issues or 
engage in persuasive or mobilizing talk. In addition, participation-related 
information may follow different distribution channels, depending on its 
content and tone. Thus, information on formal participation and 
associated mobilization efforts (e.g., requirements for voting, names and 
manifestos of the candidates, locations and dates of rallies, etc.) are 
frequently disseminated by a multitude of media outlets – from 
mainstream to alternative – and through a range of technologies – from 
newspapers to the internet – (see Couldry & Curran, 2003). In this 
context, the effect of IM discussion on conventional participation may be 
diluted, as WhatsApp would just be one among many channels. 
Differently, activism-related information and persuasion attempts (e.g., 
locations and times of demonstrations, reasons for protesting, links to 
online petitions, etc.) are commonly channeled through more private 
channels and non-mainstream platforms (Weeks et al., 2017). WhatsApp 
may therefore constitute a major, privileged platform for activism-related 
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information, which would explain its stronger influence on these forms of 
participation. 
Also, of interest are the age-differential effects of WhatsApp discussion 
on political engagement. For both conventional and activist participation, 
there seems to be a pattern of attenuation with age. In simpler words, the 
positive effect of WhatsApp discussion on participation seems to be 
stronger for younger than for older respondents. Similarly, the indirect 
pathways between news uses and participation through WhatsApp 
discussion are remarkably more evident for Millennials and Gen Xers 
than for Boomers and olders. These findings can be interpreted as a 
consequence of the ‘inertia’ effect: the fact that older adults experienced 
their early political socialization (adolescence and youth) in a world 
without internet could make them less reactive to the influence of new 
technologies on their political behaviors (Bachmann et al., 2010; 
Grasso, 2014). A complementary explanation may be a ‘generational 
accentuation’ of the effects among younger participants due to their 
higher levels of technological expertise and their larger discussion 
networks on IM apps (Chan, 2018; Xenos et al., 2014). 
Finally, our indirect models included news media use and social media 
news at the beginning of the chain of causation. Our results provide only 
partial support for an overarching, citizen communication mediation 
model, in which media stimuli trigger WhatsApp discussion and, indirectly, 
conventional participation and activism. The null finding for the indirect 
route social media news → WhatsApp discussion → conventional 
participation deserves further attention in future research. One reason for 
this lack of effect may lie in the availability of mobilizing information about 
conventional forms of participation in traditional news media, which 
makes it redundant in social media. This would mitigate WhatsApp’s 
unique additive effect over more conventional ways of engaging in 
political activities. Along similar lines, there are several considerations 
that may explain that the indirect effects of news and social media uses 
through WhatsApp did not hold consistently across countries. On the one 
hand, country-specific analyses reduce the sample size, and may 
therefore underpower our estimates. Also, all our autoregressive models 
controlled for the effects of a large set of potential confounding variables. 
This cautious approach reduces the amount of variance available to be 
explained. We have however preferred this conservative interpretation of 
our data, risking type-II error, instead of type-I. On the other hand, there 
could be country-individual interaction effects that could explain cross-
country differences in the fully mediated models that we analyzed in this 
article. Using larger country samples, future research should assess both 
macro- and micro-level factors (i.e., multi-level approaches) that may 
affect the direct and indirect relationships found in this study. 
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The present study was designed to introduce WhatsApp as a mobilizing 
force for conventional and activist participation within a communication 
mediation paradigm. Future research may add more nuances and 
advance the general model we present in this paper. For example, it 
would be of great interest to compare the relative mobilizing power of 
different settings for political discussion, both online and offline, and both 
synchronous and asynchronous: discussion face to face or over the 
phone, discussion via WhatsApp or other IM apps, discussion in online 
forums or message boards, etc. 
Forthcoming research should also examine in greater depth the network 
discussion attributes and content specific characteristics of news content 
and discussion patterns that emerge around WhatsApp, as well as their 
impact on democratic functioning beyond political participation. For 
instance, recent accounts highlight the potential for social media to 
polarize political discussions. WhatsApp interactions may not be immune 
to this trend. Research should clarify whether, and if so, under what 
circumstances, WhatsApp and IM apps create ideologically 
homogeneous communities that only share and discuss self-selected 
information and become more polarized and distrustful of diverse political 
views in time (see Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016; Stroud, 2011). This 
suggestion for future research is in line with Shah et al. (2017, p. 496) call 
to ‘rethink communication mediation’ in order to look beyond participation 
and integrate other social and politically-relevant outcomes in our 
theoretical and empirical models – specifically social trust, institutional 





1. Figures on WhatsApp use among adults for the three countries analyzed in this 
study are as follows: 32% in Spain (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & 
Nielsen, 2018), 22% in the United States (Pew, 2018), and 22% in New Zealand 
(Kemp, 2018). 
2. OLS regression analyses were performed in SPSS, version 21.0 
3. The formulae used to calculate the difference between standardized regression 
coefficients (betas) is based on the actual beta, their t-value, and their standard error. 
When z scores are obtained, differences that are z > 1.96, z > 2.56, and z > 3.3 
represent a statistically significant difference at p < .05, p < .01, and p < .001, 
respectively. 
4. Path analysis with structural equation modeling (SEM) test were performed with the 
assistance of Mplus, version 7.0. 
5. In response to suggestions from anonymous reviewers, we tested two theoretically 
plausible alternative SEMs and compared their performance characteristics. The first of 
these alternative models was analogous to that presented in Fig. 1, but included offline 
political discussion as a second mediator (parallel to WhatsApp discussion) of the 
relationships between news uses and participation behaviors. Unfortunately, this 
	 20 
second formulation provided a much worse fit to the data (χ² = 31.04; df = 5; p < .001; 
RMSEA = 0.06; CFI = 0.94; TLI = 0.83; SRMR = .031; AIC = 20942.93; BIC = 
21055.81) than did our first model (in Fig. 1). Finally, we tested a third model in which 
offline and online discussion (exogenous variables) stimulate further political discussion 
via WhatsApp (mediator) which, in turn, boosts conventional and activist forms of 
participation (outcome variables). This last structure provided a much better fit to the 
data, and offers directions for future research on discussion attributes as antecedents 
of WhatsApp discussion (see discussion): χ² = 1.10; df = 4; p = .89; RMSEA < 0.05; 
CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.01; SRMR = .006; AIC = 17093.22; BIC = 17175.32.  
6. Tests of highest order unconditional interactions for this model: [X*W, R2 = .003, F(1, 
1149) = 4.51, p < .05]; [M*W, R2 = .004, F(1, 1148) = 10.49, p < .001].  
7. Tests of highest order unconditional interactions for this model: [X*W, R2 = .001, F(1, 
1174) = 1.86, n. s]; [M*W, R2 = .017, F(1, 1173) = 39.46, p < .001]. According to Hayes’ 
(2015) description of the index of moderated mediation “evidence of statistically 
significant interaction between any variable in the model and a putative moderator is 
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